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A Principled and Structured Approach For 
Ascertaining Beneficial Interests in Property 





In Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] SGCA 36, the Court of Appeal 
provided important clarifications about the relationship between a resulting 
trust and a common intention constructive trust for the purpose of ascertaining 
beneficial interests in cases of property dispute. This issue, which has attracted 
much speculations, was left open in Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye 
Terence [2007] SGCA 54 where the same court merely confirmed the continued 
relevance of the twin presumptions of resulting trust and advancement.   
 
Facts and dispute 
 
The parties to the present dispute are two married octogenarians, Mr See and 
Mdm Chan. The subject matter of dispute was a bungalow house purchased in 
1983 for about $1.8 million (now worth about $20 million) and registered in 
Mdm Chan’s sole name. The purchase price came from a number of sources:  
 
(1) $290,000 from Mdm Chan’s life savings;  
 
(2) $400,000 from a term loan taken out in Mdm Chan’s name;  
 
(3) $400,000 from an overdraft facility granted to Mr See’s company;  
 
(4)  $8,117.35 from an account jointly held by Mr See and their eldest son;  
 
(5)  $10,000 from their eldest son; and  
 
(6)  $723,641.55 from Mr See’s savings and CPF monies.  
 
After the purchase, Mdm Chan executed a power of attorney in favour of Mr See 
and their eldest son, authorising them to manage the house and to sell it for 
such price as they see fit. In 2011, Mdm Chan revoked the power of attorney 
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fearing that that Mr See was trying to sell the house. This prompted Mr See to 
seek a declaration that he was the beneficial owner of the house under a 
resulting trust. Mdm Chan, on the other hand, counterclaimed that the house 
was a gift to her under a presumption of advancement. 
 
High Court (See Fong Mun v Chan Yuen Lan [2013] SGHC 99)     
 
One of the main disagreements in this case relates to who should be regarded 
as the contributor of the money from sources (1) and (2). The High Court found 
that Mdm Chan had transferred the sum of $290,000 as a loan to Mr See and 
therefore the true contributor was Mr See. With regards to the $400,000 from 
the term loan taken out in Mdm Chan’s name, the court found it unlikely that 
Mdm Chan agreed to repay the loan since the $290,000 loaned to Mr See 
represented her entire life savings. Instead, it was more likely that Mr See 
repaid the loan himself pursuant to an agreement prior to the purchase that he 
would be responsible for doing so. Therefore, following Lau Siew Kim, the 
$400,000 contribution was attributed to Mr See. For completeness, it is also 
necessary to note that the real litigants behind the scenes were two of their 
children. The eldest son supported Mr See while the youngest son supported 
Mdm Chan. This explains why the eldest son was seemingly happy to attribute 
his contribution to the purchase price (sources (4) and (5)) as Mr See’s. 
Applying the resulting trust approach, by which each party’s beneficial 
entitlement is in proportion to his or her respective contribution to the 
purchase price, the High Court held that Mr See was fully entitled to the 
beneficial interest of the house. 
 
The court also held that the presumption of advancement raised by Mdm 
Chan’s was rebutted. In light of Mr See’s extramarital affair, which started prior 
to the purchase of the house, his marriage with Mdm Chan existed in name 
only. It was very unlikely that he would spend so much money and incur 
substantial financial risk to make Mdm Chan such a gift. The unlikelihood of a 
gift was also supported by the existence of the power of attorney granted to Mr 
See.  
 
Moreover, the High Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support 
Mr See’s allegation that he and Mdm Chan agreed prior to the purchase of the 
house that he would be the owner. In light of such common intention, which 
was buttressed by the granting of the power of attorney to Mr See, the court 
questioned whether it was necessary to resort to the presumption of resulting 
trust. The court opined that the common intention constructive trust is ‘a 
sounder solution’ in such a case (citing Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432;Jones 
v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776) but recognised that Mr See’s claim was clearly 
supported by Lau Siew Kim. Based on the court’s findings of facts, however, the 
result would have been the same regardless of which approach the court 
adopts.  
 
The question impliedly put to the highest court is whether Singapore should 
follow the English footstep in adopting a common intention constructive trust 
as the preferred method of dealing with property disputes, at least in the 
domestic context.  
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Court of Appeal 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed its own decision in Lau Siew Kim that the twin 
presumptions of resulting trust and advancement shall be retained to address 
property disputes. However, it agreed with the High Court that ‘there can 
generally be no justification to resort to presumptions, however much they may 
reflect the norms, customs and mores of society, if the court is faced with 
the actual intentions and desires of the transferor’ ([51], agreeing also with Neo 
Hui Ling v And Ah Sew [2012] 2 SLR 831; Lim Chen Yeow Kelvin v Goh Chin 
Peng [2008] 4SLR(R) 783). This is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s 
recognition in Lau Siew Kim, which was again affirmed in the present case, that 
a resulting trust may arise independently of any presumption if it could be 
proven by evidence that the contributor of the purchase price did not intend to 
benefit the recipient. Similarly, a presumption of resulting trust may be 
rebutted by actual evidence of gift without relying on a presumption of 
advancement. Thus, even if the the parties advance their cases based on 
presumptions, it remains necessary to consider if there is any evidence that may 
adequately reveal their actual intentions ([49]–[52]).  
 
In the present case, the Court of Appeal observed that the respective cases put 
forth by Mr See and Mdm Chan were largely attempts by their children to 
‘reconstruct versions of the material events which would be favourable to their 
cause based on whatever documentary evidence there was available’ and 
therefore any alleged evidence of the parties’ intentions had to be approached 
with ‘extreme caution’ ([71]). It disagreed with the High Court’s finding as to 
the existence of a prior agreement between the parties that Mr See shall be the 
owner of the house ([161]), and therefore there was no reason to justify a 
departure from the resulting trust analysis.   
 
Focusing on the parties’ respective contributions to the purchase price of the 
house, the Court of Appeal held that Mr See failed to discharge the burden of 
proving that the $290,000 from Mdm Chan was a loan to him, thus reversing 
the High Court’s finding. That money was therefore taken to be Mdm Chan’s 
contribution to the purchase price. As for the $400,000 term loan, the court 
agreed with the High Court’s finding that Mr See’s repayment was pursuant to 
a prior agreement ([85]), and it added that had it not come to this conclusion, 
it would be willing to invoke ‘the remedy of equitable accounting to adjust Mr 
See’s and Mdm Chan’s respective shares of the beneficial interest in the 
Property so as to attribute the $400,000 from the [term loan] to Mr See’ ([86], 
adopting Lord Neuberger’s suggestion in Stack, [117]). As Mdm Chan’s 
contribution to the purchase price was only $290,000, she held 84.17% of the 
beneficial interest of the house on a resulting trust for Mr See. As to Mdm 
Chan’s allegation of a gift, the Court of Appeal found it unlikely for the same 
reasons stated by the High Court. The presumption of advancement was 
therefore also rebutted. 
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Although the Court of Appeal found that the dispute is sufficiently resolved by 
the resulting trust analysis, it nonetheless went on to examine the relationship 
between the resulting trust analysis and a common intention constructive trust 
analysis in light of recent developments in English law. The aim is to determine 
the appropriate default regime to apply for the purposes of resolving property 
disputes, particularly in the domestic context ([99]). 
 
The common intention constructive trust arises from an express or inferred 
common intention that the claimant was to have a beneficial interest in the 
property. Traditionally, a common intention will only be inferred if the claimant 
has contributed directly to the purchase price of the property, although the 
notion of direct contribution may be looser here compared to the similar notion 
under the resulting trust approach: seeGissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886; Lloyd’s 
Bank Plc v Rossett [1991] 1 AC 107. In Stack, the House of Lords decided to 
expand the common intention constructive trust in two ways. First, it held that 
the common intention constructive trust displaces the resulting trust as the 
applicable regime in addressing disputes relating to beneficial interests in 
family homes. Second, the parties’ common intention is to be ascertained ‘in 
the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it’ ([60]), thus departing 
from the traditional focus on financial contribution.  
 
The Court of Appeal refused to follow Stack in replacing the resulting trust with 
a common intention constructive trust as the preferred method of ascertaining 
beneficial interests in family homes. A few reasons were given ([152]). First, the 
social and economic landscape of Singapore has yet to change so as to make the 
operation of the twin presumptions inappropriate. Second, it is difficult to 
identify what kind of cases is truly ‘domestic’ so as to attract the approach 
in Stack. Third, the large degree of subjectivity and uncertainty in the approach 
in Stack is likely to result in an increase in litigation as well as legal costs. 
Solicitors would find it difficult to advise their clients on the likelihood of 
success of their clients’ claims.  
 
Instead, the Court of Appeal preferred an approach that would allow each 
party’s beneficial interest to be determined in ‘a principled and fairly 
predictable manner’ ([159]). It decided that Lord Neuberger’s minority 
approach in Stack satisfies this requirement. His Lordship’s approach, as 
accepted in Singapore, could be summarised as follows ([160]):  
 
(a) If there is evidence of the parties’ respective contributions to the purchase 
price of the property, the parties’ beneficial interests will be determined using 
the resulting trust approach. Each party will be beneficially entitled to the 
property in proportion to his or her contribution.  
 
(b) If there is evidence of an express or inferred common intention that the 
parties shall hold the beneficial interest in a proportion which is different from 
that arrived at in (a), the parties’ beneficial interests will be in accordance with 
such common intention. For this purpose, there is no room for the imputation 
of an intention where none exists. 
 
(c) If neither (a) nor (b) applies, the parties’ equitable interests will follow their 
legal interests.  
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(d) If only (a) applies, it remains necessary to ask whether there is sufficient 
evidence to show that the party who paid the larger part of the purchase price 
intended the payment to benefit the other party.  
 
(e) If the question in (d) is answered in the negative, a further question to be 
asked is whether a presumption of advancement applies. If it does, it will rebut 
the presumption of resulting trust in (a). 
 
(f) If, subsequent to the purchase, the parties have evinced common intentions, 
either express or inferred, that they shall hold the beneficial interest of the 
property in a proportion which is different from that in which the beneficial 
interest was held at the time of the property’s acquisition, the parties will hold 
the beneficial interest in accordance with such common intention. This is 
known as the ‘ambulatory constructive trust’.  
 
This structured and principled approach not only avoids many of the 
problems inherent in the majority’s approach but also ‘provides pragmatic and 
clear guidance on when a resulting trust and when a common intention 




It is only necessary to add a few observations and comments. First, in Lau Siew 
Kim, it was held that where the parties have contributed equally to the purchase 
price, they will be joint tenants at law and no resulting trust arises. Although 
this statement of law has not been repeated by the court in the present case, it 
is likely to remain true. 
 
Second, by allowing equitable accounting of the kind suggested by Lord 
Neuberger in relation to the repayment of a loan, the Court of Appeal is 
essentially expanding the types of financial contribution that are relevant to the 
quantification of beneficial interests under the resulting trust approach ([56]). 
This departs from the position adopted in Lau Siew Kim, under which 
mortgage repayment is only relevant if it is pursuant to a prior agreement to do 
so ([115]–[117]). The implication of this change is significant given that the 
majority of properties are purchased with the assistance of secured loans. 
 
Third, in determining whether a common intention constructive trust arises to 
alter the parties’ beneficial entitlements, the court will have regard to ‘all the 
circumstances of the relationship’ (Stack, [131]). However, since the imputation 
of a common intention is prohibited even at the quantification stage (cf Jones, 
[47]), it would be insufficient for a claimant to merely show that there was a 
common intention to share beneficial interest in the property and that his or 
her share is larger than what was determined under a resulting trust approach. 
Instead, the available evidence must sufficiently reveal how the parties 
intended the beneficial interest of the property to be divided between them. 
Under English law, an example where the court found it impossible to infer 
such an intention is Aspden v Elvy [2012] EWHC 1387, where there was no 
discussion about the claimant’s beneficial share and the only available evidence 
was his financial contribution. Having said this, the amount of evidence that is 
necessary will depend on the judicial approach to inferring such an intention. 
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Although the distinction between inference and imputation may be less well 
defined in practice, the Court of Appeal is unlikely to adopt an overly wide 
approach to inferring the relevant intention given its preference for a more 
predictable approach.  
 
Fourth, by denying special treatment to disputes concerning family homes, the 
common intention constructive trust is now applicable in the commercial 
context ([157], cf Laskar v Laskar [2008] 1 WLR 2695). This incidentally lends 
support to a common intention constructive trust analysis of the Pallant v 
Morgan equity adopted in Banner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments Ltd 
& anor [2000] Ch 372 (cfCrossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 
1619), which was approved by the High Court in Ong Heng Chuan & anor v 
Ong Boon Chuan & anor [2003] 2 SLR(R) 469. 
 
Fifth, despite its preference for the structured approach, the Court of Appeal 
admitted that ‘the court is generally constrained by the manner in which 
counsel decide to present their clients’ cases’ ([98]). Thus, the courts may not 
have a free hand in deciding whether to invoke a common intention 
constructive trust if it is not pleaded by the parties.  However, the court could, 
in an appropriate case, invite parties to make further submissions on a possible 




The Court of Appeal’s clarification of the applicable approach in ascertaining 
beneficial interests in cases of property dispute is timely in light of the ever 
increasing property prices. The emphasis on principle and certainty is patently 
sensible and is likely to be effective in addressing important policy concerns, 
particularly the need to avoid an increase in litigation and associated costs. The 
decision also marked another departure from English law, reflecting the court’s 
emphasis on the need to tailor legal rules to fit local circumstances. 
 
 
Alvin See (Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University) 
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